

China's Restructured Central Planning: From an Instrument for Control to Mechanism for Growth

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Abstract

China's Mao instituted the Central Planning Commission (CPC) for tight controls. By 1976 when his demise came, China's economy was structurally rigid and functionally inefficient. Deng Xiaoping, also a first-generation Communist, became China's paramount leader. Mao emphasized 'ideological purity.' Unlike Mao, Deng was a pragmatist. He reaffirmed the absolute leadership of the Communist Party in China. But he also wanted economic successes. One of his well-known sayings was "It matters little whether a cat's color is black or white; if it catches mice, it is a good cat." Translated, ideological purity aside, Deng wanted the Communist Party to transform the country into a dynamic force on the world stage. The former CPC continued its function in macro planning. However, instead of being a mechanism for control, the restructured CPC—renamed as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)--has since become an instrument for systemic transformation and dynamic growth.

Keywords: Centralization, Control, Restructuring, Flexibility, Adjustments, Dynamism
Expansion

Section 1: An Introductory Note

China's Communist leader Mao Zedong presided over the systemic transformation of the country's economy between 1949 and 1976. Mao needed an instrument that would control and implement his development philosophy. The State Planning Commission (SPC) was created in 1952 as a result. Through a series of Five-Year Development Plans, Mao herded China's economy into strict state controls and isolation. Development efforts failed. China remained among the less developed economies after more than a quarter century of Mao's development policies.

After Mao's demise, systemic transformation and economic reform began in 1979. The long-term reform objectives were the orderly administrative decentralization and the eventual marketization of the economy. It was a radical reversal of Mao's approach to development. Since then, China has been experiencing unprecedented growth rates never experienced in the history of world economy. By 2010, China had already surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy, second only to that of the U.S.'s. And China's sustained drive for economic growth and international dominance continues.

Section 2: A Background note

The State Planning Commission (SPC) was first established in 1952 for drafting the 5-Year Development Plans. Objectives of development-plans for each of the 5-Year Plans were established by the members of the Politburo of the Communist Party. Once these objectives were rubber-stamped by the Party's Central Committee, the State Planning Commission began drafting 'control numbers.' The control numbers specified macro objectives accentuating economic growth rate and growth rates of industrial and agricultural production. It was also the SPC's responsibility to assign resource-supply as well as production quotas to lower level administrative units. Each province and region had its own respective Planning Commission, receiving and executing orders from the SPC of the central government. The respective provincial and regional Planning Commissions would then direct Planning Commissions of even lower levels of administrations such as county and township governments. Thus, the initial directives from the Communist Party's Politburo and the SPC were coursed downwards to every level of the administrative units, reaching downward even to every industrial plant and agricultural commune throughout the land. The SPC thus became the ironclad control-mechanism that determined production, distribution and consumption quotas for every producing and consuming unit throughout the world's most populous economy.

The end result of central planning from Mao's 27 years of reign left China's economy in extensive disarray, tracing farther and farther behind its neighboring economies' performances. Upon Mao's demise in 1976, however, the first generation revolutionaries began expressing their desire for pursuing a genuine economic growth path.

Mao's nearly three decades of demagogic rule and control over every aspect of China's political, social and economic domains left China's vast population impoverished by the time of his demise in 1976.

Section 3: The Dawn of Economic Restructuring

Deng Xiao-Ping, twice purged by Mao as a 'capitalist roader,' replaced him as China's paramount leader. By 1978, Deng had consolidated his power. Whereas Mao insisted on 'ideological purity,' Deng, though a first-generation Communist leader like Mao, trusted less in ideological rigidity and more in development outcomes. He was a pragmatist. One of his well-known sayings was: "It matters little whether the cat's color is black or white; if it catches mice, it is a good cat." It was an implicit criticism of Mao's ideology and approach to economic development. Nevertheless, Deng was a Communist. Or, at least, he insisted on the absolute leadership role of the Communist Party in China.

As evident in North Korea, what the Party leader dictates or directs, the Party leadership routinely and invariably obliges. Deng recognized the Command system's wastefulness and inefficiency. And he was well aware of the merits of the market system as evidenced by the booming economies of the four neighboring economies. He envisioned an efficient and vibrant economy for China. Once his leadership role was secure, Deng called for economic reform and restructuring. By December 1979, the 11th Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party rubber-stamped Deng's call for economic reform, decentralization and liberalization. A new chapter in China's development efforts dawned.

Section 4: Research Objective

The SPC under Mao was the mechanism for centralization and control. After nearly three decades of political upheavals and erratic economic policies between 1949 and 1976, China's economy was permeated with structural rigidity and functional inefficiency. Yet it has been the same yet restructured state planning mechanism that has been instrumental in guiding and expediting China's phenomenal successes in systemic transformation and growth.

The objective of this paper is to highlight the pivotal and yet often overlooked role played by the state's planning mechanism in China's drive for modernization. The paper provides a framework for future research, suggesting that the development approach through a well-oiled planning mechanism as that of China's may be of value to the less developed economies in the world.

Section 5: Review of Literature

The Communists won China's civil war in 1949. Faced with an embargo imposed on the newly established Communist regime, China willingly accepted technical and financial assistance from the former USSR. China's general development approach as a result patterned closely after that of the former USSR's.

China's first 5-Year Development Plan (1953-1957) was drafted and implemented with guidance from advisors from USSR. The focus of the first 5-Year Development Plan was on industrial and agricultural production (Financial Economic Commission & National Commission for Development and Reform, The People's Republic of China. 2008. p. 615). The emphasis was on increased production in agriculture and industry, with greater emphasis being placed on rapid increases in heavy industries. As China was primarily an agrarian-based economy in the early 1950s, the Plan was to achieve rapid industrial production at the expense of the agricultural sector by siphoning off surplus value from the primary to the secondary sector (Mantzopoulos, 2011, 8-10). Thus, the second 5-Year Plan (1958-1962) reemphasized the expansion of heavy industry while concurrently implemented additional measures socializing privately owned means of production (Five-Year Plans of China. P. 3). Once the SPC's proposal for a new 5-Year Plan was approved by the Communist leadership, then all the relevant ministries, bureaus, provincial and local administrative units would be assigned input supplies and production quotas. For consumption, each household was assigned rationing coupons from staples to bath tissues, without which no purchase could be made. In sum, under Mao, the SPC was the controlling mechanism in all aspects of production, distribution and consumption.

Reform began in early 1979. The catch phrase propagated from on high was: "adjust, reform, rectify and improve." Upon the dawn of reform, the new task of the SPC therefore was to draft and plan directives from the central administration for the implementation of administrative decentralization, phased liberalization of economic activities, systemic restructuring and transition into a 'socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.' It was the existing SPC's responsibility to craft China's phased, gradualism approach to systemic transformation. Phenomenal successes followed upon the heels of successive years and then decades of unprecedented growth and modernization. By 1998, the SPC was restructured and renamed as the 'Development Planning Commission' (SDPC). After merging with the 'Commission for Restructuring the Economic System' and the 'State Economic and Trade commission', the SDPC was renamed again as the National Commission for Development and Reform (NCDR) in 2006 (Chow, 2011). In tandem with the depth and breadth of reform and successes as well the ever changing world economic conditions, the NCDR's functions and responsibilities correspondingly kept evolving. As a result, new departments within the Commission were being established and the parallel functions had become increasingly more focused. Thus, new Departments such as the 'Department of Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment,' 'Department of High Tech Industry,' 'Department of Employment and Income Distribution,' 'Office of National Economic Mobilization,' and 'Office of Key Project Inspectors' have all been established to plan for and administer corresponding domains within their respective jurisdictions ("Main Function of Department of NDRC, " 2018).

China's economy continued growing in line with the guidelines and objectives set forth by the 5-Year Plans. In tandem with the progression of economic successes, flexible and timely adjustments to new planning spheres and emphases correspondingly kept evolving. As an example, the Chinese government released a document in July 2016 titled: "Next-Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan." The Plan calls for a \$210 billion expenditure by 2025 for research and development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies (Laskai, 2017). Translated into reality, China is racing to be the world leader in the development and application of AI technologies. In the author's analysis, China's race to dominate the promising AI industries '...will rely on old school centrally guided economic development.' That is, it is still the responsibility of the state's central planning mechanism--the restructured SDPC--to draft and then guide the implementation of directives from on high. China's central planning system, as is evident, is no longer an instrument for controlling economic activities but an engine for growth and world leadership.

Economic reform and restructuring began in 1979. The SPC continued exercising its established role as the macro control mechanism during the early years of reform. Nevertheless, China was on its way to reform; with it, the structure and functioning of the central planning commission correspondingly began its progressive metamorphosis and adjustments in accordance with the changing domestic and world economic conditions.

Section 6: Central Planning after Mao

The focus of reform was “adjust, reform, rectify, and improve.” The scope and pace of phased systemic transformation, therefore, were to be determined by performance outcomes. If ‘the cat catches the mouse,’ then the scope of reform in a given sphere of the economy widens and the pace of reform accelerates. Deng’s dictum thereby also determined how the function and processes of the SPC and the 5-Year Plans were to transform over time.

When reform began, market forces were permitted to play only ‘an auxiliary role’ in China’s socialist system. As the scope of reform widened and speed accelerated, however, market forces increasingly began replacing state planning as the primary coordinating mechanism. Over time, the focus of the state planning mechanism evolved from reform to development.

A long-term objective of China’s systemic transformation was the replacement of state control via the SPC with market coordination in production, distribution and consumption. Calculated and orderly administrative decentralization began. The catalyst that would be instrumental in achieving that objective was to unleash the long-suppressed entrepreneurial spirit of the masses. The role of the SPC was to remain as a control mechanism in that the pace and scope of private initiatives displacing the state was to be orderly, market-tested and outcome-based, culminating in the role of the SPC overtime being more ‘indicative’ rather than directive of macro objectives for each of the succeeding 5-Year Plans.

Faced with the reality of China’s vast population and complex social fabrics, the initial steps of reform were both minuscule in scope and guarded in disclosure. The role of the SPC, therefore, remained unchanged at the beginning for ‘orderly’ purposes. Decisions over several pivotal reform measures originated directly from directives on high that were beyond the jurisdiction of the SPC. Only when successes of reform measures became evident, reform scope widened and reform pace accelerated that the structure and function of the SPC began adjusting as well for sustained successes in its subsequent Plans.

As an example, the first pilot reform-project began quietly on a farm in Anhui province. It was an administrative decision without the input from the SPC. In early 1979, 18 members of a production team in one of the countless agricultural communes were permitted to be independent producers, no longer having to take directives from the production brigade/commune they used to belong to. These 18 independent farm producers were assigned production quotas. The yield over and above the mandated quotas, however, now belonged to the farmers rather than to the commune. The farmers still needed to sell the surplus yield to the state, but at a higher state purchasing prices than the official quota-based ones.

When the glaring successes of that pilot project proved that entrepreneurial spirit inherent in private initiatives could play a pivotal role in transforming China’s stagnant economy, the scope of reform on farm widened and deepened over the succeeding years. The SPC’s 5-Year plans thereafter began taking the evolving successes on farm into account and began drafting future plans for the economy accordingly. In tandem with sustained success of systemic transformation, the newly restructured planning mechanism’s emphases have also been correspondingly adjusting and re-focused over time. Its primary functions now include (1) drafting long and annual operational development plans, (2) defining the scope and policies for sustained and deepening systemic restructuring, and (3) determining adjustment-policies as the pace of China’s integration into the world economy accelerated.

Section 7: Plan Emphases and Objectives, 1981 – Present

7.1: The 6th Plan (1981-1985)

The Sixth 5-Year Plan witnessed the dawn of revival for China’s stagnant economy. In drafting the Sixth Plan, the theme of ‘adjust, reform, rectify, and improve’ dominated the focus of planners. On the domestic front, the Planning Commission directed its attention to overcoming challenges posed by the fossilized economic structure imposed on China by Mao. Some of these challenges included sectoral imbalances, backward technologies, production inefficiencies and structural rigidities. China was still struggling with insufficient agricultural and industrial outputs. China needed financial resources. China needed advanced technologies. Heeding the central government’s decision to improve economic relations with the international communities, the SPC proceeded to draft plans for attracting investments from neighboring economies as well as rebuild its foreign trade sector.

As a result, as early as 1980, China had already established four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which became the conduit for foreign capital inflows on the one hand and channels for export on the other for items produced within these SEZs. (Financial Economic Commission, 2008, p.375 ff.).

7.2: The 7th Plan (1986-1990)

The two key facets of this Plan were economic development on the one hand and systemic restructuring on the other. On the domestic front, the Plan envisioned improved production efficiency that would culminate in increased industrial production by 6.7% for each of the five-year period while agricultural production was to grow by 4.0% annually. The Plan also shifted the country's investment emphases from excessive prominence given to the production of steel and related heavy industrial products as in the past to infrastructure construction and raw materials industries. On the external front, the Plan followed Deng's directives that China should open its doors wider to external economic relations. As China declared 14 cities north of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1984, the Plan incorporated measures to increase capital inflow as well as sustained growth in imports and exports at a 5% a year for each of the Plan period. Increased imports would then result in inflow of advanced technologies (Financial Economic Commission, 2008. P. 297 ff). Figure I in Section 9 of the paper provides an overview of the substantial growth in foreign capital inflow over time. As a result, as presented in Figure II, capital injection from overseas concurrently helped power the rapid increases in both imports and exports. The outcome of China's reform policies, as may be gathered from Figure III and IV, thereby have resulted in been unprecedented growth in both the GDP and per capital GDP increases.

7.3: The 8th Plan (1991-1995)

This was a period of continual growth in external trade, in capital inflows, in modernization and in deepening of structural reform. It was a period of planned growth, adjustment and modernization. By the end of the Plan period, China's GNP reached 6.13 trillion Yuan, which was nearly 2.8 times higher than only 15 years ago. Foreign trade rose from 1990's 299 billion Yuan to 1995's 1.25 trillion, far exceeded the respective growth rates of the two previous Plan periods (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017. Pp. 56 and 342). To further widen China's door to the external economies, cities on the county level totaling 1,100 became open to foreign economic relations. With rapid economic growth and rise in national wealth, planned modernization yielded concrete results. Hundreds of capital-intensive projects to improve the nation's infrastructure were initiated and completed. Transportation system, especially rail, air and seaports, roads and highways kept being newly built or upgraded. China's 5-Year Plans, as in W.W. Rostow's development theory, in effect became the pivotal instruments in building up the 'preconditions for take-off' in the development process (Financial Economic Commission, 2008. P. 213 ff.)

7.4: The 9th Plan (1996-2000)

This was a period wherein no detailed targets were cited. However, it was a period of planned rapid growth. It also marked the period when China actively sought membership in the WTO. The long-term planned objective of accession to WTO was continual growth in the export sector. For growth, the Plan set quadrupling 1980's GDP as an objective by the year 2000. And it further targeted a doubling of 2000's GDP by 2010. The GDP in 1980 was US \$303.76 billion. By the end of the Ninth Plan period, its GDP had soared to 1,205.26 billion. The longer-term objective of doubling 2000's GDP by 2010 was also achieved and exceeded. Whereas China's 2000's GDP was \$1,205.26 billion, it had reached \$6,040.37 billion by 2010. The role played by the State Development Planning Commission in the development process is nearly self-evident (Financial Economic Commission, 2008. P. 157 ff). Tables I and II in section 9 below illustrate the restructured planning mechanism's pivotal role in transforming China's backward economy into a dynamic force in the world's development annals.

7.5: The 10th Plan (2001-2005)

The 10th Plan sought to strengthen China's economic relations with the international community. Alternately stated, it was the period when China began searching for investment opportunities abroad with its vast financial reserves and resources. China's 'going out' policy thus became a key objective and variable in its long-term growth and development plans. Recognizing the limited potential of traditional exports as a source for sustained growth in international trade, product quality and varieties became a focal point for planning. Strengthening and upgrading China's competitiveness on the international market was a development target.

Increasing emphases, therefore, began to be placed on R&D, on acquiring from abroad and then developing on its own advanced technologies. The Plan called for increased investment in R&D funding to at least 1.5% of its GDP during the Plan period. Continual growth in GDP, in industrial, agricultural and service sectors remained a priority for the Planned targets. Concurrently, however, new emphasis such as energy saving technologies, developing green energy forms, pollution abatement and closing the income gap between urban and rural regions all became new focuses for the SDPC (Financial Economic Commission, 2008. P. 79 ff).

7.6: The 11th Plan (2006-2010)

The Plan set a modest annual GDP growth rate of 7.5%. The Plan promoted sustained structural transformation, aimed to increase urban employment by 45 million for the 5-year period and improve social services by increasing the number of older persons in urban centers being covered by the pension program. Since the Tenth Plan (2000-2005) period witnessed another five-year of economic growth far exceeding planned target, phenomenal growth in energy and water consumptions had become a major concern. Therefore, the Seventh Plan set a 20% decrease in energy consumption per unit of GDP and a 30% reduction in water consumption per industrial value-added products. As the economy continued its process of “adjust and improve,” the share of GDP originating from the tertiary sector kept up its upward momentum. As a planned objective, the 11th Plan aimed to increase the share of employment in the service sector to rise from 31.3% to 35.3% by the end of the Plan period. On the environmental front, instead of accentuating tree planting as in the previous five years, the 11th Plan specifically set a 10% reduction in discharges of the more hazardous pollutants. Finally, as the target for R&D for the 10th Plan period was not met, this 11th Plan re-emphasized the imperative of increased spending on R&D. Since the R&D funding for the previous Plan failed to reach its spending target of 1.5% of GDP, this 11th Plan called for the spending to increase from 2005’s 1.3% to 2.0% of GDP by the end of the Plan period. R&D is not only crucial in improving the quality and increasing the variety of the country’s exportable goods, China envisions itself as a future manufacturer of high-end and high-tech products as an engine of sustained growth (Financial Economic Commission, 2008. P. 3 ff).

7.7: The 12th Plan (2011-2015)

Whereas earlier five-year Plans focused more on “reform and rectify,” the direction of planning and development focus began shifting steadily toward “adjust and improve.” The standard planned objectives such as GDP growth and strengthening external economic relations remain part and parcel of the more recent 5-Year Plans. However, among other planned emphases, more intense interests have also been placed on developing new and strategic industries, upgrading product qualities, enhanced R&D spending, nurturing the accelerated increases in the cadre of quality scientists who are capable of transforming research results to practical and concrete applications, continual efforts in improving energy efficiency, developing green energy forms and pollution abatement. Furthermore, due to widening disparity of reform benefits received between populations in urban centers and rural regions, select planned emphases have also been placed on measures to speed up development of rural economies. Therefore, over the three and half decades of reform, the overall planned emphases have metamorphosed from structural reform/ adjustment to improved functional efficiencies, from increased quantity to improved quality and from traditional to advanced methods in production and distribution (Lewis, 2011 & “Key Targets” 2011).

7.8: The 13th Plan (2016-2020)

The 13th Five-Year Plan’s emphases comprise of innovation, modernization of industrial base, high tech R&D, expanded ‘international cooperation,’ quality improvement in and diversification in the range of industrial products, development of alternative energy forms, pollution abatement and narrowing the income gap between urban and rural populations (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 2016). In order to maintain the sustained growth in the export sector, the 13th Plan envisions growth in the share of higher-end consumer products in foreign markets, technological advances, intensified R&D activities, continual expansion of China’s reach in the third world countries and improved quality of life via more equitable distribution of income and cleaner environment. In brief, the 13th Plan casts a long-term vision of China’s role in international affairs and economic relations.

Table I provides an overview of China’s planned targets and their respective performances for the planning period 1981 through 2015. A few entries of the desired information on the planned targets are not available. That is because these desired data were not specifically mentioned in official documents on the 5-Year Plans.

Nevertheless, a prima facie review of the available information in the Table I would suggest that China's drive toward maturity in its economic restructuring and functioning may well add a new chapter in the annals of systemic transformation and economic growth. And the tentative conclusion of this survey is that China's restructured central planning mechanism has been instrumental in both the engineering and the implementation of the country's sustained growth.

Section 8: The Pivotal Role of China's Restructured Planning Mechanism for Growth

A more current example of NDRC's pivotal role in planning and expediting China's continual drive towards economic expansion and international influence is China's "Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)." On March 18th, 2015, jointly with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, the NDRC issued the document on the "Belt and Road Initiative." (Hereafter BRI) (NDRC, 2015) The idea is to revive the "Silk Road" of bygone centuries. That is, re-establishing connections between China and the rest of the world, especially the less development economies along the old Silk Road. One statement in the document highlights the scope of China's intended reach: "The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas." Translated into reality, China invests its vast currency reserves in the less development economies along the BRI for expanded overseas markets as well as political influence through financial muscles. As a result, eight countries along the BRI are found to be at risk and 15 additional developing countries face 'quite high risk' for debt service problem for credits extended to them by China (Cheang, 2018). China's planned worldwide-reach through its economic power has henceforth enhanced the apprehension of the West over China's long-term influence on the world stage (George, 2018).

In sum, as systemic transformation and reform deepened and the scope of adjustment widened, the relationship between the central government and its central planning apparatus, adaptively went through concurrent transformation and reorientation. Instead of passively receiving directives from the Party Politburo controlling a static command-style economy, the central government increasingly became reliant on qualified scientists, researchers, experts, and scholars in the preparation of a 5-Year Plan. Not only the quality of planning witnessed substantive improvement over the three-and-half decades of reform, the Plans themselves have successfully endured the test of a dynamic and rapidly evolving globalization process. Instead of suffocating the productive potentials of the masses, the Plans since reform began have increasingly been an instrument of actualizing the entrepreneurial drive of China's vast labor force.

Economic planning exists in all economies in the world. In China, however, the planned objectives receive full cooperation, support and institutional assists from the government. That is, the overall objectives--whether they be economic, or now social and political as well--are set by the central administration. The mechanisms and evolving institutions required for the fulfillment of the objectives, however, are planned by the NDRC. Once a draft Plan is accepted by the Party hierarchy and rubber-stamped by the People's Congress, the Plan receives the full and active assists from the State Council for implementation. The Plan is an instrument of the state. It no longer dictates. Rather, through accompanying policies and evolving institutions, it induces, empowers and expedites the actualization of productive potentials of the masses. That is, the transformed and restructured government planning mechanism has evolved from an instrument of structural rigidity and functional inefficiency to a dynamic and constructive vehicle for growth outreach.

Section 9: Tables and Figures

Table 1: Planned Targets and Performances of China's 5-Year Plans (1981- 2015)

5-Year Plans	Targets (Annual Growth)	Target	Performance
6 th Plan (1981-1985)	GDP	n/a	7.8%
	Value of Agricultural Production	4.7%	5.1%
	Value of Industrial Production	10.0%	9.2%
	Value of imports and Export	16.0%	16.5%
7 th Plan (1986-1990)	GDP	7.5%	7.80%
	Value of Agricultural Production	4.0%	4.6%
	Value of Industrial Production	7.5%	13.1%
	Value of imports and Export	8.1%	9.4%
8 th Plan (1991-1995)	GDP	6.0%	12.9%
	Value of Agricultural Production	3.5%	4.1%
	Value of Industrial Production	8.5%	17.3%
	Value of imports and Export	n/a	19.5%
9 th Plan (1996-2000)	GDP	8.0%	8.3%
	Value of Agricultural Production	n/a	7.5%
	Value of Industrial Production	n/a	17.8%
	Value of imports and Export	n/a	11.0%
10 th Plan (2001-2005)	GDP	7.0%	9.5%
	Value of Agricultural Production	13.0%	13.0%
	Value of Industrial Production	n/a	14.0%
	Value of imports and Export	n/a	24.5%
11 th Plan (2006-2010)	GDP	7.6%	10.7%
	Value of Agricultural Production	n/a	4.4%
	Value of Industrial Production	8.0%	12.3%
	Value of imports and Export	n/a	13.8%
12 th Plan (2011-2015)	GDP	8%	7.9%
	Value of Agricultural Production	n/a	4.1%
	Value of Industrial Production	n/a	8.1%
	Value of imports and Export	n/a	21.7%


Source: Financial Economic Commission & National Commission for Development and Reform, The People's Republic of China (2008, January) and China Statistical Yearbook 2017, p. 62, 343..

Table 3: Select Economic Indicators

Year	GDP (Yuan)	Annual GDP Growth (%)	Per Capita GDP
1978	3679	Base Year	385
1979	4101	7.6	423
1980	4588	7.8	468
1981	4936	5.1	497
1982	5373	9.0	533
1983	3021	10.8	588
1984	7279	15.2	702
1985	9099	13.4	866
1986	10376	8.9	973
1987	12175	11.7	1123
1988	15180	11.2	1378
1989	17180	4.2	1536
1990	18873	3.9	1663
1991	22006	9.3	1912
1992	27195	14.2	2334
1993	35673	13.9	3027
1994	48638	13.0	4081
1995	61340	11.0	5091
1996	71814	9.9	5898
1997	79715	9.2	6481
1998	85196	7.8	6860
1999	90564	7.7	7229
2000	100280	8.5	7942
2001	110863	8.3	8717
2002	121717	9.1	9506
2003	137422	10.0	10666
2004	161840	10.1	12487
2005	187319	11.4	14368
2006	219438	12.7	16738
2007	270232	14.2	20505
2008	319516	9.7	24121
2009	349081	9.4	26222
2010	413030	10.6	30876
2011	489301	9.5	36403
2012	540367	7.8	40007
2013	595244	7.8	43852
2014	643974	7.3	47203
2015	689052	6.9	50251
2016	744127	6.7	53980


Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2017, p. 57, 64.

Figure 1: GDP Current (100 Million Yuan)




Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2017 p. 62

Figure 2: GDP Per Capita (Yuan)




Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2017 p. 63

Figure 3: Total Exports and Imports (100 Million Yuan)



Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2017 p. 343

Figure 4: Total Foreign Investment Actually Utilized (USD 100 Million)



Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2017 p. 365

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